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Abstract:
Over the decades, the films of Yasujirō Ozu have inspired a number of
contradictory responses from film critics and theorists. Initially, formal aspects of
his work, which Western commentators found difficult to comprehend in relation
to the thematic dimensions of the films, were often said to reflect aesthetic and
philosophical principles associated with Zen Buddhism. Like the recurrence of
plots that explore the transformations of the Japanese family, many formal
attributes of Ozu’s films were assumed to express various ideas related to traditional
Japanese values. In their work on Ozu, Kristin Thompson and David Bordwell do
an admirable job of debunking many clichés and misconceptions about the
relationship of Ozu’s work to Zen philosophy, aesthetics, and social conventions.
Undoubtedly though, a metaphysical outlook emerges in Ozu’s work that is neither
wholly conditioned by the socialised norms of Zen and tradition, nor entirely free
of them. This paper considers and analyses a claim made by Gilles Deleuze about
the metaphysical orientation of Ozu’s work, one which ascribes aspects of Ozu’s
style to a Zen conception of time. This particular argument concerns Ozu’s famous
still lifes, and it is my contention that through considering some aspects of
Deleuze’s reading of Ozu alongside Bordwell, Thompson, and Noël Burch’s writing
on the director, we can see what is asked of us by a film like Ozu’s Late Spring
(Banshun, 1949), which offers us an opportunity to rethink the relations between
cinematic form, narrative, and emotion.
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Many commentators on the films of Ozu Yasujirō have insisted on the
importance of the observation and evocation of change in the director’s
work. Change may be understood in this regard as personal, social, or
cosmic: as a transformation that characters and their relationships
undergo, as the giving way of traditional norms and adoption of new
modes of living, or as an ephemerality that characterises all existence,
human or otherwise. In this article, I will offer a reading of Late Spring
(Banshun, 1949) inspired by Gilles Deleuze’s brief consideration of Ozu’s
work in Cinema 2: The Time-Image (1985). In doing so, I will situate
Deleuze’s claims about Ozu both in relation to some of his other
philosophical writings, and to various claims made by scholars, theorists,
and critics in considering Ozu’s work, particularly Late Spring. The first
section will use a number of these writers to establish Ozu’s engagement
with social change, as well as the fact that such engagement is linked to
both a considerable involvement in the lives of his characters and a
metaphysical outlook that emerges through the relations binding style and
narration. Like many of Ozu’s best critics, Deleuze emphasises the films’
observation of social change, but he also clearly recognises an affinity to
his own philosophy in the metaphysical vision refracted in the filmmaker’s
work. Ozu is for him ‘the greatest critic of daily life ’, whose films after the
Second World War observe the ‘mutation of an Americanized Japan’
(1985/2005, p. 18–9), but these films also, Deleuze claims, establish a
perspective in which ‘one and the same horizon links the cosmic to the
everyday, the durable to the changing’ (p. 17). It is above all in his analysis
of the famous images of a vase set before a shoji screen in Late Spring that
Deleuze’s view of Ozu’s work crystallises, and it is by way of this
crystallisation that I ultimately argue for the importance of linking change
to questions of horizon and event.
Documenting Change
In his chapter on Ozu in Sexual Politics and Narrative Film, Robin Wood
attacks two assumptions he considers to be particularly entrenched in
Western spectators’ understanding of Ozu: the ‘Japaneseness ’ and
essentialism of his work.1 That is, the films are often conceived of as at
once quintessentially Japanese, and about a universal and eternal human
condition.2 While Wood allows that Ozu’s strategies – notably the use of
1. Wood’s chapter is a revised version of an article that appeared in the Winter 1992
edition of CineAction!.
2. For instance, Donald Richie – whose Ozu: His Life and Films (1974) Wood sees as
having done much to establish these assumptions – argues that Ozu’s abiding subject
was the dissolution of the family, a particularly Japanese ‘ catastrophe ’ for Richie (p.4),
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extended transition sequences – establish a relationship of ‘contemplative
distance ’ between the spectator and the situations depicted on screen, he
insists that such contemplation is not directed toward ‘some ineffable
mystery but the concrete and often prosaic realities of life-in-society ’
(p. 112). And while such realities are placed in what Wood calls a
metaphysical context, in which ‘awareness of time, transience, death, and
an inanimate universe ’ is elicited, there is, he rightly claims, no need to be
versed in the intricacies of Zen philosophy in order to appreciate this, nor
any reason to subsume the particularity of the lives explored in the films
to an essentialist vision of ‘ Japaneseness ’, human nature, or cosmic being.
The virtue of Ozu’s work is for Wood that it compassionately involves
us with characters, while maintaining enough distance for reflection on
issues of relation and value that are both social and metaphysical (p. 112).
This is an apt summation, but we should note that the social
‘contemplation ’ inspired in Wood is directed mainly toward the way the
institution of marriage serves the patriarchy (Late Spring and Early
Summer [Bakushū, 1951]), and the erosion of community, beginning with
the family, realised by capitalism (Tokyo Story [Tōkyō monogatari, 1953]).
While the latter point, in particular, raises an issue pertinent specifically to
Japan after World War 2, overall Wood does not deal with the specificity
of the situation in Japan at the time these films were made. Rather, he
argues – in opposition to the vision of Ozu as culturally conservative
corollary to the assumptions of his Japaneseness and essentialism – that
the films offer a critique of patriarchy and capitalism that transcends the
national. These films are, for Wood, against the way things are. However,
they can better be understood as engaged with the mutation of Japan from
within, rather than as judgments of either tradition or transformation.3
David Bordwell clearly establishes in Ozu and the Poetics of Cinema that
early in his career the filmmaker was at home amidst the growing mass
culture of the 1920s. ‘The director so often identified with ascetic
otherworldliness ’, Bordwell writes, ‘ turns out to be constantly referring to
contemporary concerns, alluding to passing fashions, and developing
political ideas ’ (1988, p. 33). Ozu regularly reveals his interest in the
sociocultural changes taking place in a modernising Japan, even if at times
while contending that the Ozu film is essentially about ‘human nature in all its diversity
and variation ’ (p.17).
3. Wood contends that Late Spring is a tragedy and a radical condemnation of traditional
marriage as an institution that subordinates and imprisons women (1998, p. 119). But
as Andrew Klevan argues, this reading ‘ seems incongruous with the film’s moment by
moment style which understands the characters worries in terms of their everyday
perspective, not in terms of an all embracing sociopolitical theory ’ (2000, p. 166n2).
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we may sense in the director’s irony a reluctance to embrace new
alterations of everyday existence introduced by capitalism and imported
Western ideas, styles, and commodities. More recently, Alastair Phillips
has argued that Ozu’s work should be understood not as reflecting a static
conception of ‘ Japaneseness ’, but as observing a transformation of national
identity, ‘an active contestation between the past and present ’ (2003,
p. 163), corresponding to two distinct periods of modernisation, before
and after World War 2 (p.157).4 In particular, Phillips claims the films
after the war – which Richie, for instance, sees as turning away from social
issues – vigorously engage the contestation between tradition and progress
in postwar Japan, a period in which a new formulation of nationhood
inevitably occasioned a sense of loss (2003, p. 155).5 That the postwar
films for the most part present the lives of members of middle-class
families, rather than the struggling underclasses – as in Ozu films from the
30s such as Passing Fancy (Dekigokoro, 1933) and The Only Son (Hitori
musuko, 1936) – can thus be attributed to both drastic changes in the
economic situation in Japan after the war, and to the director’s intuition
that middle-class families offered innumerable possibilities for examining
the mutation gripping the country.
Late Spring is of particular interest in this regard, as Professor Somiya
(Ryû Chishû) and, especially, his daughter, Noriko (Hara Setsuko), can be
seen as both invested in tradition and open to the change offered by
the new Japan. As Kristin Thompson has argued, the knowledge that
marriage became a matter of mutual consent in Japan after World War 2,
with the signing of a new constitution, is critical to understanding the
film. When the marriage laws went into effect in 1948, legal equality
between men and women on a number of matters – such as inheritance,
property rights, and divorce – was established (1988, p. 319–20).6 In this
light, we may interpret differently the behaviour of Somiya, who urges his
daughter to marry in order to begin her own family, apart from the
traditional Japanese family structure, or ie. In short, we may see him as
more interested in pushing her to ‘ live her own life ’ than in trying to
ensure that she lives in accordance with established traditions, and this,
4. Both Wood and Phillips centre their arguments on the trilogy of postwar films – Late
Spring, Early Summer, and Tokyo Story – starring Hara Setsuko, which makes their
differing approaches to the films’ social engagement stand out all the more clearly from
one another.
5. See Richie 1974, p.5.
6. Phillips more fully develops the notion that Ozu’s films engage gender issues
contemporary to their making, and relates this to the proliferation of ‘new classes of
Japanese female consumers and spectators ’ during the period (p. 156).
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Thompson argues, was quite a departure from earlier notions of how
a Japanese father should act (if not from many of the fathers in other
Ozu films).7
The case of Noriko is more complicated. As both Wood and Andrew
Klevan argue, Noriko’s resistance to marriage is attributable to her
reluctance to relinquish the considerable freedom she enjoys in her life
with her father. But Noriko is indeed also somewhat idiosyncratically
traditional (for instance, in seeing the remarriage of her widowed uncle,
Onodera [Mishima Masao], as ‘unclean’), and Phillips seems correct in
insisting that she is a link between generations, a woman both attracted to
the new and sensitive to the continuities of the past (p. 160). She is
thereby different in a crucial respect from her friend Aya (Tsukioka
Yumeji), the moga, or modern girl, who, both sympathetically and
humorously presented, arranges her house, cooks, and dresses in Western
fashion.8 While Noriko also dresses in Western clothing and prefers
sitting on chairs to the floor, her embrace of the new opportunities open to
women after the war is most forcefully registered through the relative
liberty she enjoys for the majority of the film. This freedom is perhaps
most evident in the bike ride to the beach she takes with Hattori (Usami
Jun) – her father’s assistant, who her father and aunt briefly believe may be
a potential husband – without provoking censure.9 Through the character
of Noriko, then, Ozu engages the uneasy co-existence of pervasive
national nostalgia and the drive for social (as well as technological and
economic) progress that defined the period.
We should not, however, let the social relevance of Ozu’s work lead us
into regarding the experiences of the characters, with which Ozu involves
us deeply, as simply illustrative of contemporary issues. As Klevan argues
in Disclosure of the Everyday (2000), perhaps what is most stirring about
Late Spring is its treatment of personal loss that arises through ‘situations
which seem to be part of the expected (living) order of things…[or] as a
result of the realization of an intended project ’ (p. 203). The loss explored
in the film is that of a daughter having to separate from a father – with
whom she has a markedly genial relationship – in order to marry, and it is
by his own design, in making Noriko believe he will remarry, as well as in
urging her to move forward, that Somiya winds up alone in a house mostly
7. For a similar reading of Somiya’s attitude, see Rothman 2006, p. 34. Thompson’s vision
of the ‘occupation liberalism ’ of both Professor Somiya and Ozu is certainly not without
contention. See for example Geist 1989 and 1997, p. 116–7n18.
8. On this point, see Phillips 2003, 159–60.
9. Though their arguments are quite different, both Wood and Klevan stress that the
relative freedom of Noriko’s life with her father is gradually curtailed.
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emptied of his daughter’s presence. There is, then, something universally
human about the loss explored in the particular relationship the film
examines, although it is also clearly expressive of a specific moment in
Japanese history. Ozu’s work thus, quietly and remarkably, brings together
change and loss at the levels of the individual and society.
It also does more than this though, illuminating the horizon of the
human sphere depicted in his films, and evoking a sense of universal
transience through the suggestion of forces of life at nonhuman scales.
Klevan makes some of the clearest and most evocative arguments in this
regard. Considering the sequence in Late Spring where Somiya speaks to
Onodera at Ryōan-ji Garden, in Kyoto, Klevan notes that the images of the
rock garden (or karesansui) that make up the transitions before and after
the narrative ‘block ’ – the conversation between the two men – are nearly
identical, a not uncommon tactic of Ozu’s. Arguing for the importance of
such repetitions, Klevan claims the transition shots in cases such as this
should be understood as framing devices, which have the effect of placing
‘the minutiae of the human incidents stylistically, and therefore
thematically, in the centre of a wider world’ (p. 144). We could say that
the film thus establishes, or at least elicits thought of, a horizon outside of
that enveloping the human situations at the film’s core. It is not that we
aren’t made to contemplate, as Wood insists we should, particular social
issues, but that alongside this contemplation another is made way for,
which would embed the changes taking place at the personal or social
levels within a more cosmic perspective.
Thus Klevan argues that Ozu’s transition sequences ‘ inflect ’ our
understanding of the film’s events with a sense of the ‘ incongruity
which arises when we consider our day to day lives beside something
more enduring’ (p. 152). While they don’t determine what we understand
the film to be about, or its primary effect on us, these sequences do alter
the way in which we think about the human events depicted (p. 144). So
while the shots of landscapes, urban spaces, or interiors always have
something to do with the locations where the story takes place (even if we
don’t recognise them as such initially), they also exceed that function.
They embed in the regular rhythm of the film – which arises most
generally from repetitive movements from one block of story development
to another by way of Ozu’s distinctive transitions – the spectre of rhythms
at different scales: the scale of trees, for instance, as well as those of the
ecosystem and world of which they are part. If we accept this evocative
account, what then are we to say of a ‘still life ’ or ‘ landscape ’ image that
interrupts these rhythms, which enters into the blocks of narrative? It is to
this question that Deleuze’s consideration of Ozu offers a forceful
response, but to understand his argument it is first necessary to turn to
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Noël Burch’s claims regarding Ozu’s ‘pillow shots ’, as well as to some of
the problems raised by these claims.
Pillow-Shots and the Horizon of the Diegesis
In To the Distant Observer, his book on Japanese cinema published in
1979, Burch groups Ozu’s still lifes, landscapes, and shots of empty spaces
together under the heading ‘pillow-shot ’, whether they belong to
transitions or are interpolated into story sequences (p. 160–2). He
calls them pillow-shots because he judges them to be similar to the
pillow-words, or makurakotoba, of classical Japanese poetry of the Heian
Period, which are stock epithets, adjectives that tend to serve a decorative
function rather than modifying the meaning of the nouns to which they
are appended. Burch argues that in Ozu’s films some pillow-shots are more
‘pure ’ than others, depending on their relations to the development of
story information, the purest being those that ‘ transmit no diegetic
information beyond the suggestion of a timeless place or presence ’
(p. 170). For Burch, it is especially important that these images constitute
a decentring of a film’s telling of a human story, contributing to a style of
narration that is opposed to the ‘profoundly anthropocentric ’ world-view
he judges to be implicit in the ‘Western mode of cinematic representation’
(p. 161). Here, we need to consider why Burch sees this decentring as
critical to Ozu’s contribution to cinematic stylistics.
As a system of continuity is one of the defining features of what Burch
refers to here as the Western mode of cinematic representation, he places
particular emphasis on the way Ozu’s cutaways cause a suspension of the
diegesis. He contends,
while these shots never contribute to the progress of the narrative proper,
they often refer to a character or a set, presenting or re-presenting it out of
narrative context. The space from which these references are made is
invariably presented as outside the diegesis, as a pictorial space on another
plane of ‘ reality ’ as it were, even when the artefacts are, as is often the case,
seen previously or subsequently in shots that belong wholly to the diegesis.
(1979, p. 161–2)
In another passage, Burch claims that it is characteristic of Ozu’s
pillow-shots that the emptiness of the image is ‘unsituated in diegetic
space-time’, and that sometimes this emptiness is a result of characters
having left or not yet entered the frame, while at others it is due to the fact
that the images are simply ‘outside the film [and] show a setting or prop in
and for itself ’ (p. 293). The problem here seems to be twofold. Firstly,
we need to ask if it is true that these images mainly serve the function of
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introducing discontinuities that break up the flow of the diegesis, and,
what is at stake, at least for Burch, in their doing so. Secondly, we need to
determine just what these images should be considered outside of: what is
the diegetic horizon that Burch is here referring to?
We can better understand the context of Burch’s claims if we consider
the manner in which he defines diegesis at the outset of To a Distant
Observer. Burch declares a preference for the notion of processes that
produce a diegetic effect to that of the diegesis as a stable entity. He claims
that the two key processes are the development of the spectator’s
‘absorption ’, and ‘the implementation on the screen of the “codes” which
catalyse that absorption’ (1979, p. 19). The result of these very loosely
defined processes is then said to be an effect ‘whereby spectators
experience the diegetic world as environment ’, in a sense entering into the
imaginary space-time constituted by the diegesis for the duration of a film
(p. 18–9). Burch contends, drawing on Brecht, that this effect is
ideologically suspect. It is then a power of distancing, or of introducing
discontinuities that facilitate critical thought in spectators about such
absorbing processes, that Burch attempts to attribute to Ozu’s ‘pillow-
shots ’ and other aspects of the director’s stylistics.10 This is clearly related
to his claim that Ozu’s work presents us with a ‘ typically Japanese
approach to the perception of three dimensions by stressing that their
representation is not to be taken for granted ’ (p. 160, Burch’s emphasis).
Seen in this light, it appears Burch is arguing to some degree that Ozu’s
work shows us that traditional Japanese aesthetics has something to offer
in the construction of a less ideologically suspect, less ‘absorptive ’ cinema.
Bordwell closely attends to and criticises a number of Burch’s claims
considered above. He takes issue, for instance, with both Burch’s
descriptions of how those images he defines as pillow-shots function,
and with the classification of them as pillow-shots itself, since there are
other specific types of words in traditional Japanese poetic forms that
Bordwell claims Ozu’s images are often more similar to (1988, p. 104–5).
It is his criticism of Burch’s deployment of the term diegesis that is here of
greatest interest though. Bordwell argues that Burch seems to be working
with multiple definitions of diegesis, moving indiscriminately between
the conception of it as story information, as action, and as a bounded
space-time in which these appear. He claims that Burch falters when he
uses analyses of the effects of particular images to designate general shot
10. See Wood for an insightful outline of the assumptions underlying Burch’s approach in
To a Distant Observer (1998, p. 102–5).
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types without considering the strategies and systems of which the images
are part. Burch’s main problem is thus, according to Bordwell, that his
conception of narrative remains undefined, that he refers ‘ indifferently to
causal, temporal, and spatial principles of organization’ (p. 105).
It is doubtless bizarre to claim that any shot in a film is outside of that
film. We can, however, deduce easily enough that Burch really means
some images are outside of what could be called a narrative horizon.
We should recall though that the diegetic processes he describes, while
they produce a narrative, are first of all occupied with the production
of a stable, ‘absorptive ’ space-time through conventional techniques
of constructing cinematic space, such that an apparent continuity
between movements, within and between shots, produces an effect of
verisimilitude. His problem is thus not, as Bordwell claims, that he needs
an undergirding notion of narrative since Burch wants to make ‘diegetic ’
processes those that produce a world and involve the spectator in the
events of that world. This may remind us of Deleuze’s conception
of the two most general processes at work in the regime of the
movement-image: the differentiation of the elements of a world in
which they are simultaneously integrated; and the specification of images
as signs in rational intervals of movement, as perception-, affection-, or
action-images, the rational relations of which ‘catalyse ’ the first process
(2005, p. 27–8).
Burch’s problem may then be understood as his conception of diegetic
processes as conventional features of continuity editing, such as
shot-reverse shot procedure and the 180x rule. As Bordwell and others
argue (and my own experience bears this out), the principle function of
the alternatives to these employed by Ozu as part of his own system is not
to, as Burch asserts, effect discontinuities, for instance through ‘bad’
eyeline matches (p. 159). The claim that cutaways introduce discontinuity
is more plausible, though, and Bordwell acknowledges that Ozu’s
cutaways and transitions often break up or delay the development of
causal relations within the story. However, he also argues that they can be
linked with other images in a film along different parameters: they may be
parts of ‘parametric ’ patterns developed by way of graphic matches,
conceptual links, or the symmetrical organisation of shots (p. 122–3).
As we will see, Deleuze also acknowledges that Ozu’s still-lifes,
landscapes, and images of urban spaces are not simply discontinuous.
But while some connections made are, as Bordwell contends, often
‘outside of ’ the causal chain by which our involvement in the film’s story
is developed, Deleuze seems to suggest that some images, while they may
indeed impede sensorimotor connections, are intimately involved with the
lives of the characters.
Change, Horizon, and Event in Ozu’s Late Spring
291
The Reserve of Events in their Appropriateness
Burch’s analysis of Ozu’s pillow-shots clearly influenced Deleuze, but
Deleuze is more coherent in describing the horizon that he believes
certain images transgress, and more ambitious in the value he ascribes to
some of them. In the few pages he devotes to Ozu in The Time-Image, he
differentiates between still lifes and shots of empty spaces or landscapes,
claiming that the distinction is one between fullness and emptiness, in
accordance with the subtle relations taken on by these terms in traditional
Chinese and Japanese thought.11 However, while Deleuze is careful to
note he is aware of the subtlety of the distinctions developed between
these images, and that many images transform from empty to full, or vice
versa, the conclusion he comes to about those that should be considered
still lifes is drawn from a very specific example.
This example, taken from Late Spring, is the famous image of a vase
placed before a shoji wall – a transparent screen through which silhouettes
of bamboo can be seen – in the Kyoto inn where Professor Somiya and his
daughter stay during their last trip together before she is to be married.
Deleuze’s interpretation of the image emphasises its relationship to those
images that precede and follow it. This image, Deleuze argues, occupies an
interval in which a change takes place since it appears between an image
of Noriko smiling, and another of her staring at the ceiling and beginning
to cry (1985/2005, p. 16) [Figures 1–3]. A change takes place during an
image in which nothing seems to take place. But this paradox is only the
shadow of a larger one for Deleuze. The form, he argues, in which change
takes place, which never itself changes, is made use of to express change.
Or, as Deleuze puts it, the image of the vase ‘gives what changes the
unchanging form in which the change is produced’ (p. 16). Thus, the
eternal and the ephemeral are here brought together in a single image, and
an absolute horizon – the form in which all change takes place – enters
into a chain of images that describe a transformation within the horizon of
everyday human existence.
We can relate these complex arguments to one that Deleuze makes in
the Nineteenth Series of The Logic of Sense, in which he discusses Zen.
There he claims, adopting the language of Zen to define a concept he takes
up repeatedly in his own work, ‘The event is the identity of form and void’
(1969/1990, p. 136). The vase image seems like precisely such an event for
11. On the importance of the distinction between emptiness and fullness in relation to still
lifes, also see Deleuze’s reference to D.H. Lawrence’s consideration of Cezanne’s work
(1985/2005, p. 274n38). Of course, as is central to Deleuze’s analysis of Ozu, the still
life in cinema must be distinguished from both photographic and painted still lifes
because the filmmaker gives it a duration (1985/2005, p. 16).
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Figures 1–3: From smile to tears
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Deleuze: change takes the form of an image emptied of human presence,
and yet that image expresses a transformation, or event, at a human scale.
The image constitutes what Deleuze calls an ‘aberrant movement ’,
a movement of time itself, rather than a movement in space that reveals
time through the modes – duration, succession or simultaneity – by which
it is generally known.12 The ‘representation’ of duration is made here to
paradoxically express change, but also that which endures ‘ through
the succession of changing states ’ (1985, p. 16). That is, according to
Deleuze, the image of the vase reveals time as the unchanging form of
all that changes, as a pure and empty form ontologically prior to the
movements, regular or otherwise, through which we are generally
made aware of it. ‘What aberrant movement reveals ’, he writes, ‘ is time
as everything…anteriority over all normal movement defined by
motivity…anterior to the controlled flow of every action’ (1985/2005,
p.36). As he phrases it in Difference and Repetition (1968), what is revealed
is that ‘ time itself unfolds…instead of things unfolding within it ’ (p. 111).
The play of emptiness and fullness is therefore seen to be as well the play
of change, the form it takes, and the ultimate horizon to which this form
attests.
While the image of the vase is not, as Deleuze implies, entirely static,
since the bamboo stalks outside, beyond the shoji wall behind the vase,
move in the breeze (attesting to another scale of time), its form is
nevertheless relatively stable, and its most evocative attribute is indeed its
duration.13 The image is then full both because its persisting form brings
time to the forefront, and since a change in a human soul occurs while it is
on screen. However, it is ‘void ’ both because it does not immediately offer
a human content, or logical or formal connection to any of the film’s other
images, particularly to the human events it is cut into. Its relation to the
shots of Noriko is not clearly given, but its continuity with them is.
We can partially understand the shot of the vase as a meeting point of
Ozu’s emphasis on aesthetic form – in cutaways and transitions, but also
images where characters are present – and the development of his story
line. It magnifies the film’s recurrent and varied emphasis on stable
composition, which gives ‘empty ’ images a power (however slight) of
12. This is a point Deleuze derives from Kant and develops to his own ends: ‘Time, [Kant]
tells us, has three modes: duration or permanence, coexistence and succession. But time
cannot be defined by any of the three because you cannot define a thing through its
modes ’ (1978, p. 15).
13. The first image of the vase and shoji lasts four seconds, but Deleuze’s assertion that it is
ten speaks to the fact that it seems longer than it is because the time given over to it
suggests a meaningfulness that is not apparently ‘ justified ’ by its content.
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affecting the way we think about the human events depicted, and a value
that is to varying degree independent of the role such images play in
temporally and spatially situating plot elements. But because in its
placement it serves as the continuity link between two disparate mental
states, the vase image seems to take on a particularly intense valence in
relation to the story. It’s in this crossing of formal and narrative series that
the unique charge of the image resides. Abé Mark Nornes, in a piece
entitled ‘The Riddle of the Vase ’ (2007), remarks that while Bordwell and
Thompson effectively correct Richie’s loose description of the shot as one
that captures Noriko’s point of view, which it does not, they fail to engage
with why the image is so ‘oddly powerful ’, a question which preoccupies
Richie and Paul Schrader (p. 86).14 The image does not simply brake
‘the narrative flow because of its indifference to Noriko’s emotional
situation’ (Thompson & Bordwell 1976, p.65), but enters into that flow by
standing in for an emotional ‘event ’.
While disputing Schrader’s claim that the image occasions a
transcendence of the everyday, Deleuze agrees with his contention that
it ‘ links the everyday in “something unified and permanent” ’. It brings
together the everyday and a cosmic horizon, a single time: ‘ the visual
reserve of events in their appropriateness ’ (1985/2005, p. 17). In this
phrase, which is a reference to the Shōbōgenzō, written in the 13th
Century by Dōgen, a Zen master of the Rinzai School, Deleuze reveals that
he recognises an affinity between his own philosophy, Ozu’s films, and the
Zen notion of a ‘reserve of events ’. He, in fact, makes further reference to
such a ‘reserve ’ in both The Fold (1988/1993) and What Is Philosophy?
(1991/1994). In the latter, he states that this ‘reserve ’ marks out ‘a horizon
of events ’ that is ‘ independent of any observer and distributes events into
two categories, seen and nonseen, communicable and noncommunicable ’
(p. 220n2). It is the source of all events, and within it horizons dependent
on observers are established, within which some events can be perceived.
‘As the Chinese (or Japanese) philosopher would say’, Deleuze writes in
The Fold, ‘ the world is the Circle, the pure “reserve” of events that are
actualized in every self and realized in things one by one’ (p. 106). Such a
‘reserve of events ’ is also referred to as the ‘secret part of the event that is
at once distinguished from its own realization, from its own actualization,
even though realization does not exist on the outside ’ (p. 105). In this
view, the world and time are equated as the source – and thus part – of all
events, both those within and outside human horizons, as well as,
14. See Richie (1974, p. 174) and Schrader (1972/1988, p. 49–51).
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importantly, those events through which such horizons – within which
legible, localised events become perceptible – are themselves produced.
In the Time-Image, Deleuze describes the distinction as one between
man’s banal horizon and an inaccessible and always receding cosmological
horizon. In specifically cinematic terms, he claims that Ozu’s still lifes not
only interrupt the formation of a ‘human’ horizon through sensorimotor
linkages, but move outside that horizon, constituting new types of
connection between it and an absolute horizon beyond. Some ‘still lifes ’
may thus be seen as not only or primarily transgressions of the
development of a human story, but also as events that redefine both
that story’s relationship to an absolute horizon (which the world of the
film at the least contains a gesture toward), and the relationship of humans
to the world outside the perceptions of it they are able to form in pursuit
of their needs or desires.
Rhythm: Duration and ‘Legibility ’
In examining the transformation of individuals and their relationships,
as well as in observing the ‘mutations ’ taking place in Japan at various
points in time, Ozu occupies himself with transience at a human scale. But
in carrying the form in which such changes take place into a narrative
through which such transformations are explored, he moves toward
an identification of incessant change and a permanence of which it is part.
It is something like the inverse of the large-scale strategy realised through
the employment of transitions made up of images of the natural world,
which Klevan explores. Whereas such transitions generally embed human
change in the greater permanence of the natural world (and establish a
rhythm with the suggestion of rhythms at other scales within it), the image
of the vase and bamboo silhouettes is a localised event that injects a link
with permanence into the transformation in Noriko, making time suggest
a ‘hidden’ meaning through rhythmic ‘aberration ’.
This relation between rhythm and the power attained by the image of
the vase and shoji can be related to Burch’s observation in Practice in Film
Theory (1973) that a spectator’s experience of a shot’s duration is
conditioned by its ‘ legibility ’. Legibility refers for Burch, as it does for
Bordwell, to our ability to see what the image offers us without having to
attentively attempt to ‘read’ it. ‘An uncomplicated two-second close-up’,
Burch writes, ‘will appear to be longer than a long shot of exactly the same
duration that is swarming with people; a white or black screen will appear
to be longer still ’ (p. 52). This observation appears in a section in which
Burch attempts to show the complexities involved in structuring a film
along fixed rhythms. It is not only the length of the shot that matters when
considering cinematic rhythm, he concludes, but also the amount of time
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it takes for us to recognise (consciously or not) that we have seen in the
image what we were intended to see.
Shot length and legibility are thus two parameters that Burch sees
involved in a fundamental structural dialectic, one which he argues should
be exploited to creative ends rather than evaded by composing images for
which the relation between the two terms is constant. In regard to Ozu,
what is of interest is Burch’s claim that one pole of such rhythmic
innovation is the employment of shots that cause a ‘ tension’ because we
seem to be able to recognise what they offer in a far shorter amount of time
than they remain on screen (1979, p. 53). Such a tactic may result, as he
suggests, in boredom, but this is clearly not the case in the image of the
vase and shoji. Rather, the tension developed here is a result of the fact
that the time allotted, as well as the emotionally charged atmosphere into
which it is inserted, suggest the importance of the image without revealing
its meaning, a meaning that the remainder of the film will do little to
clearly illuminate. Burch’s argument here was also clearly influential on
Deleuze, though Deleuze gives legibility the opposite meaning.15 The
image becomes legible for him to the degree it makes us aware that it
exceeds the role it plays, or simply does not play a role, as a sign in a
sensorimotor schema. A legible image is an image we must read, in which
habitual recognition fails to locate such signs, and such recognition is first
of all dependent on the dialectic between shot length and what Deleuze
calls the relative ‘rarefaction ’ or ‘saturation’ of the image, its having, or
seeming to have, too little or too much information to be taken in during
the time it is onscreen (1983/2005, p. 13–4). Rarefaction, as in Ozu’s work
is found in images that ‘place the whole accent on a single object ’, or
images emptied of humans, which play no clear part in the development of
sensorimotor relations (or the plot). We may need to do more than simply
‘see ’ a rarefied image if it remains onscreen for an apparently excessive
length of time.
The image of the vase first of all announces itself as an event, then,
through the way it emphasises this dialectic between the parameters of
shot length and legibility, in Burch’s sense of the latter term. We must then
retrospectively consider that a change has taken place while it was on
screen, that it serves as a link between the two images of Noriko, with
which it is – judging by her father’s snoring, which continues from image
to image – temporally contiguous. And because the length of the shot of
15. Nevertheless, Deleuze’s notion of the legible image, or ‘ lectosign ’, is indebted to Burch’s
analysis of Ozu’s work in To a Distant Observer, as is explicitly acknowledged
(1985/2005, p. 275n41).
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the vase seems to exceed that necessary for us to take in the information
offered visually, time impresses upon us a weight that seems to demand
that the image be read as intimately related to what is taking
place narratively. Time ceases to arise from the connections between
perceptions and actions, as a succession revealed by movement. Instead, it
becomes an event in its own right, which is evident firstly from the force
with which it brings out the importance of the dialectic between shot
length and legibility and focuses our attention on the amount of time
granted the image, and secondly from the teleological perspective in
which it is the interval in which a transformation takes place in Noriko.
Yet we may, prompted by Ozu’s deployment of the image, ‘read’ even
further, finding ‘ legible ’ in it, like Deleuze, an evocation of the
unchanging form of all that changes, or, as I have asserted, an event of
the identity of form and void.
Rock Garden (of Forking Paths)
We can though think of the first image of the vase and shoji not only as
standing in for the transition that takes place in Noriko, as an interval of
change, but also as binding her disparate states together. Her smile is
bound to her tears in a single temporal movement. In this regard, it is
important that her smile is associated with the marriage of Onodera, of
which she is speaking to her father just before he falls (or pretends to fall)
asleep. She expresses regret for having told Onodera it was ‘unclean’ of
him to remarry, commenting that he and his new wife, Misako (Katsuragi
Yōko), are perfect together. Thus, her smile, and apparent enthusiasm, is
associated with this relationship, which appears to her as a ‘good’
marriage. It is not much of a stretch to imagine that her vision of the
possibilities for her own marriage becomes more optimistic alongside this
recognition. The sudden emotional turn would then be linked not to a
contradictory thought, but rather to a correlated recognition: that even if
her marriage is ‘perfect ’, she will lose her relationship with her father.
There is, we could say, no life without the embrace of change, no living
without loss.
Thus, the film examines both the need to invent a new mode of
existence to move forward, and, as Klevan argues, the loss that is
inevitably brought about through such invention. Furthermore, this
‘ truth’ about life, can be related to the pressing issue of forging some
uneasy balance between tradition and progress in postwar Japan, between
the promise of possibility in the new and the fear of losing what has
grounded one, and given life meaning, in the past. From this perspective,
it is not the case that, as Klevan contends, the ‘ inanimate vase ’ gives us a
sense of [Noriko’s] ‘uncrystallised thoughts circling around varying
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manifestations of stillness ’, stillness conceived as potentially both that of a
tranquil marriage and an ‘ornamental lifelessness ’ (p. 137). Rather, the
image of the vase crystallises this conjunction of life as transformation and
loss, and thus, as Rothman writes drawing on Klevan’s claim, it can be
seen as standing in for what Noriko sees in her mind’s eye (2006, p. 40).
It stands in, that is, for a recognition that links potential happiness with
an accompanying sorrow, elation and nostalgia. The film does not affirm
that the life to be lived will be worthy of what has been lost. But while
offering no such guarantee, it does seem to present Somiya’s view that
Noriko must actively create a life with her husband, rather than fitting into
an established model of marriage, as well as the tacit affirmation that such
creation is not possible without loss of some form, as wisdom.
And, of course, there is a second image of the vase, which follows that of
Noriko silently crying. About four seconds into this image, which lasts
nine seconds, the sound of Professor Somiya’s snoring is joined by a
musical theme that serves as a bridge to the following scene, which
tellingly takes place at the famous rock garden at the Ryōan-ji Zen temple
in Kyoto. The musical bridge seems to both serve the familiar function of
alerting us to the fact that a transition is about to occur, and to join this
image to those of the rock garden that follow, such that we may feel that
what Bordwell calls a ‘categorical inclusion’ is taking place (1988, p. 122).
That is, we can see the image of the vase and silhouettes as being
compared to, or, more to the point, belonging to the same class as, not
only the images of the garden, but the garden itself, as associated with an
aesthetic that is allied to a view of the nature of life [Figures 4–7].
The impossibility of ever knowing if an act that occasions loss will be
worth it, and knowing about that impossibility: such is the immanence of
human existence, and this perspective can be related to a recognition
conveyed by rock gardens like that at Ryōan-ji. Burch actually uses rock
gardens as his example when arguing that Ozu’s films reflect the
traditional Japanese belief that artistic representations of three-
dimensionality should not allow the perceiver to take them for granted
(1979, p. 160). He alludes to the fact that in such gardens there are fifteen
stones, and that no matter where one sits on the veranda (like that upon
which Somiya and Onodera sit in Late Spring), only fourteen can be seen.
The fifteenth, it is said, can only be seen by someone who has experience
satori, which is commonly, if incompletely, rendered as enlightenment.
Thus such rock gardens emphasise our immanence in the world, since
they place us in a position from which at least one element of a totality
always escapes our perspective. They remind us that transcendence is
denied us, but also that in contemplating this truth, or simply moving to a
different position, we may transcend the limits of our own thought and
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vision at a given moment. In this regard, we can think of Ozu’s work from
a broader point of view, of the new perspectives opened up by his constant
recycling and reorganisation of versions of the same story, each giving us a
new image of the world.
To assert that such a metaphysical vision is at work in Late Spring, or
Ozu’s films generally, is not necessarily to suggest the personal and social
change explored in the films is diminished beneath thought of human
knowledge as limited, as haunted by processes that elude representation.
Such a thought is only part of everyday existence, nothing without it,
incapable of wholly ameliorating the pain of personal loss, or resolving the
claims of tradition and progress in the present. As Klevan perceptively
argues, Late Spring evokes ‘an everyday perspective where one cannot see
the complete picture, so to speak. The film suggests that an all-embracing,
long-term philosophy of an ongoing natural cycle cannot act as a
consoling influence if a character, such as Somiya, is living and feeling a
life day by day’ (pp. 151–2). But whereas Klevan claims that the film’s
images of nature feel lifeless because they are without human movement
(p.144), they seem to me to fill the film with a sense of the degree to which
life exceeds the narrowly human horizons in which it appears to us in our
Figures 4–7: From the Inn to the Rock Garden
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everyday lives. That the numerous trees seen in transitions are alive with a
life that moves at a scale significantly removed from our own, suggests not
that such life is ‘ insubstantial ’ in comparison with the familial relationship
explored, but that such relationships could themselves be clarified if one
could understand the work of forces that escape human representation.
In any case, the films’ linking of cosmic mystery with the travails of
individuals and Japanese society, as well as their establishing its residence
in everyday objects and ephemera, is an integral part of their wonder. The
worlds constituted by Ozu’s films relate scales of change in a manner that
forcefully evokes the meaningfulness of such relation without fixing it. We
may, like Deleuze, dwell upon the way Ozu’s work, while never
attempting to escape a human perspective, gestures toward the horizons
of it, bringing us in contact with thought of what lies beyond. It is certain
that such thought puts us on ground that is somewhat unstable. It also,
though, reminds us why – however strong the arguments offered through
consideration of the historical periods they address, or the aesthetic or
philosophical traditions and notions they may be suggestive of – Ozu’s
films remain vital for many living far outside the contexts in and for which
they were produced. There is no point at which that fifteenth stone will
make itself available to us, such that we can close the book on an Ozu film,
but our thought remains alive to the degree that we continue to formulate
and multiply the way in which his works are able to move us, emotionally
and cognitively, from one position to the next.
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Cinema: Texts and Contexts. Alastair Phillips and Julian Stringer, eds. New York:
Routledge, 78–89.
Phillips, Alastair (2003). ‘Pictures of the Past in the Present: Modernity, Femininity and
Stardom in the Postwar Films of Ozu Yasujiro ’. Screen 44.2: 154–166.
Richie, Donald (1974). Ozu: His Life and Films. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Rothman, William (2006). ‘Notes on Ozu’s Cinematic Style ’. Film International 4.5: 33–42.
Schrader, Paul (1972/1988). Transcendental Style in Film: Ozu, Bresson, Dreyer. New York:
Da Capo.
Thompson, Kristin (1988). Breaking the Glass Armor: Neoformalist Film Analysis. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Thompson, Kristin and David Bordwell (1976). ‘ Space and Narrative in the Films of Ozu ’.
Screen 17.2: 41–73.
Wood, Robin (1998). Sexual Politics and Narrative Film: Hollywood and Beyond. New York:
Columbia University Press.
FILMOGRAPHY
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